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 1 Introduction
This paper considers how asymmetric tax treatment, where labour market earnings are taxed
but household production is not, a⁄ects educational choice and labour supply in a perfectly
competitive labour market. While the present paper builds on Booth and Coles (2007), it
di⁄ers in introducing taxation and focusing on the subsequent deadweight losses.1 To keep the
analysis of the tax program relatively straightfoward, we also in the present paper assume that
the labour market is perfectly competitive.
A key insight of the model of the present paper is that individuals have an incentive to
specialise; either to focus on home production, or to invest in general human capital and work
mainly in the labour market. For reasons that will become clear, we show why women, who
typically have greater labour supply elasticities than men, might face increasing returns to
education. We further show that a tax on labour market earnings can generate a large (non-
marginal) switch to home production and that the ensuing deadweight loss is not a small
Harberger triangle.
There is a large literature which analyses optimal education choice and dynamic labour
supply within a lifecycle framework (see Trostel and Walker (2006) and the references therein).
As checking second order conditions is complicated in such frameworks, the typical approach
is to assume an interior solution and characterise a solution to the ￿rst order conditions. But
there is good reason to believe the second order conditions might fail. For example consider a
one-period textbook case where the agent chooses education e, labour supply l and consumption
c to solve the utility maximisation problem
max
e;c;l
u(c;1 ￿ l) s.t. pc ￿ M + [wH(e)]l ￿ ￿e;
1. In Booth and Coles (2007), we showed how increasing returns to education interact with imperfectly
competitive labour markets. In that model there was no taxation, in contrast to the present paper. Moreover, in
that earlier paper we showed an additional e⁄ect absent from the current paper, namely that increasing returns
to education are exacerbated by frictional labour markets because of an increasing wage-competitiveness e⁄ect.
This arises because, in a frictional labour market, ￿rms bid more competitively for workers￿ services as the
value of employment increases. And since, in frictional labour markets, wage compression decreases at higher
productivity levels, the marginal returns to education are further increased as education increases. This e⁄ect is
not found in the current paper, where we examine instead the impact of taxation in perfectly competitive labour
markets, and demonstrate how tax policy can have deadweight losses for some individuals in the economy.
2where H(e) describes the worker￿ s general human capital given education e; w is the market
wage rate for skills, and ￿ is the cost of acquiring education. As labour market earnings
wlH(e) exhibit increasing returns to scale in education and labour supply, this problem is not
a concave programming problem. Thus second order conditions are likely to fail and corner
solutions apply. For example, it is an empirical fact that many individuals exit education at
compulsory school leaving age. It is also an empirical regularity that some do not participate
in the workplace and instead focus on home production. The same second order condition
problem is faced by more complicated dynamic models in which earnings are also of the form
wHl.2
In this paper we extend the above simple optimisation problem to allow for a two-period
model of home production and individual heterogeneity in home and workplace productivity.
As education and labour supply are complements in the above earnings function, wH(e)l; and
in the model to be developed below, educational choice and labour supply will be positively
correlated across individuals. By increasing earned wages in the workplace, more education
tends to increase individual labour supply. But it is not di¢ cult to see that the return to
education is a⁄ected crucially by the anticipated utilization of education; i.e., by expectations
of future labour supply. If one does not anticipate being in the workplace for long, there
is little sense in making a costly educational investment that will bring only a small market
return. Thus more education and greater labour supply are mutually reinforcing choices. Using
cross-sectional data across a huge array of countries, Trostel and Walker (2006) show there is
a universal strong positive correlation between individual education choice and labour supply.
Their insights are also consistent with the trend increase in female education and participation
rates in virtually all OECD countries (see Jaumotte (2003)).
But here we go a step further and argue these re-inforcing e⁄ects may generate increasing
marginal returns to education. Speci￿cally, we will show that the expected marginal return to
education is proportional to l￿(e;￿)wH0(e): This term is composed of two e⁄ects:
(i) wH0(e) is the Mincerian return to education - it describes the increase in the market
wage rate through an increase in education;
2For example see the in￿uential paper Trostel (1993) among many others.
3(ii) l￿(e;￿) is the optimal labour supply choice of an individual with education e and char-
acteristics ￿; and thus describes the utilisation rate of human capital in the workplace.
When utility is linear in consumption, we will show there are increasing marginal returns
to education if l￿(e;￿)wH0(e) is increasing in education, which in turn requires that labour
supply is su¢ ciently elastic. As Trostel and Walker (2006) ￿nd that the elasticity of l￿(e;￿)
with respect to education is, on average, around four times larger for women than for men,
then women are much more likely to face increasing returns to education. Indeed there are
necessarily increasing returns for individuals at the non-participant margin, as the marginal
return to education is zero when l￿ = 0.
Of course in a competitive environment with no taxation, the phenomenon of private in-
creasing returns to education does not, by itself, yield a market failure. But in the analysis to be
developed below, we show that - once taxes are imposed on labour market earnings while home
production remains untaxed - private increasing returns lead to large switches in behaviour. A
worker who otherwise might invest in education and participate in the labour market (paying
income tax to the government), instead switches to non-participation and pure home produc-
tion (paying no tax). An important contribution of this paper is to show that it is typically
women who experience the correspondingly large deadweight losses.
[Insert Figure 1 near here]
Our paper also uses a cross-country panel dataset to illustrate correlations between di⁄erent
tax policies and average working-age male and female participation rates and years of education.
As Figure 1 clearly demonstrates, male labour-force participation rates are typically high and
closely clustered, in contrast to the much lower and more heterogeneous female participation
rates. Later in the paper, we shall show, using ￿xed-e⁄ects estimation and controlling for
demographics, that average tax rates, taxes on second earners and child bene￿ts are signi￿cantly
negatively correlated with both female participation rates and years of education.
1.1 Related Literature
Time-use studies show that non-participating women of working age are typically engaged in
home-production rather than leisure (see for example Apps and Rees, 1996; Apps, 2003). Indeed
4Burda et al. (2007) establish that female and male leisure hours are roughly equal. Instead it
is the allocation of work hours between the workplace and domestic production which di⁄ers
signi￿cantly between the sexes. The central theme of this paper is to consider how tax policy
distorts the allocation of work hours between the workplace and domestic production, and how
education choice is also a⁄ected.3
Perhaps the closest paper to ours is Bovenberg and Jacobs (2005) (but also see Jacobs
(2005) and Jacobs and Bovenberg (2007)). That paper considers optimal tax policy where the
government taxes labour income but, as workers also underinvest in education, it in addition
o⁄ers education subsidies. As their framework is closely related to the one to be developed in
our paper, it is at ￿rst sight surprising they do not need to consider increasing returns. However,
the critical di⁄erence between the frameworks is they assume marginal home productivity is
zero at the non-participation margin; i.e. where l = 0: [For the referees: in Appendix B
(not intended for publication), we illustrate how their arguments are a⁄ected when marginal
home productivity is strictly positive.] Whenever marginal home productivity is su¢ ciently
large, non-participation may become a binding constraint and increasing returns are then a
robust phenomenon. Unfortunately increasing returns imply ￿rst order conditions are no longer
su¢ cient to describe optimal behaviour.4 Furthermore a marginal tax analysis is no longer valid,
as we shall show that small changes in tax rates can lead to discontinuous jumps in educational
investment and labour supply. It is not surprising then that the theoretical literature typically
avoids this non-concavity issue. But the optimisation theory, when properly done, is interesting
since the switch to home production can lead to (discontinuously) large deadweight losses.
In a neglected paper, Rosen (1983) provides the appropriate intuition for the results iden-
ti￿ed in our model below. He considers a labour market model with two skills where in the
￿rst period the worker invests in either or both skills, and in the second period then allocates
time across each skill. He shows agents tend to specialise - to invest mainly in one skill and
3Important papers, Apps and Rees (1996; 1999) and Alesina, Ichino and Karabarbounis (2007) consider how
tax policy a⁄ects labour supply and household production. They do not consider educational investments, which
are our main focus here. In order to focus on education in a tractable framework, we have made simplifying
assumptions about the household, as will be explained below. See Booth and Coles (2008, forthcoming) for
a more complicated analysis of education and labour supply in a framework with two-person households who
match endogenously but in which there is no taxation.
4If marginal home productivity is very small, the Bovenberg-Jacobs approach may still apply, as increasing
returns only occur over a small region and a solution to the ￿rst order conditions will describe optimality.
5allocate time to utilising that skill. In our context, individuals specialise and become either
work specialists or home specialists. Work specialists have high participation rates in the labour
market and so enjoy a higher market return to investments in general human capital. Work
specialists thus tend to invest in high levels of education. Conversely home specialists have
low participation rates (or perhaps work part-time) and, on assumption that post-compulsory
schooling improves domestic productivity less than market-sector productivity, invest less in
education. An individual￿ s optimal choice of specialism depends on comparative advantage
arguments - how productive is that individual in the home relative to the workplace. But we
shall show that the partition between the two specialisations depends on taxes: higher income
taxes imply more individuals become home specialists. A small marginal increase in income
tax leads some to switch to home specialisation. The large drop in tax paid (a tax payer is
switching to domestic production and pays no tax) yields a correspondingly large deadweight
loss.
Rios-Rull (1993) considers optimal skills acquistion in a competitive economy with home
and market production, while Booth and Coles (2007) model that decision within an imper-
fectly competitive labour market with no taxation. Those papers do not consider how income
taxes distort education and labour supply. However, Booth and Coles (2007) suggest that the
government might o⁄er publicly-provided childcare bene￿ts, to encourage greater female par-
ticipation rates. Finally Schindler and Weigert (2007) neatly ￿nesse the second order condition
problem highlighted here by assuming that education increases the probability of earning a high
wage wH in the second period, and there are only two wage outcomes w = wL;wH. The ￿rst
period problem then reduces to
max
e
p(e)V H + (1 ￿ p(e))V L ￿ ￿e;
where p(e) is the probability of the high wage outcome and V i is the second period payo⁄
which depends only on the wage outcome i = L;H (i.e. V i does not otherwise depend on e).
Assuming p concave then guarantees a concave programming problem.
61.2 Outline of the Paper
The next section decribes the model and Section 3 derives the optimal education and labour
supply choices of individuals for a given tax environment. Section 4 considers how changes
in the tax environment distort those decisions and establishes that there are large deadweight
losses when there are increasing (private) returns to education. It argues that women are most
likely to bear those costs. Using a cross-country aggregate panel dataset, we then in Section 5
describes correlations between tax policy and average male and female participation rates and
years of education across a number of OECD countries.
2 The Model
A representative individual￿ s (pre-tax) earnings are wl; where w is the (competitive) market
wage rate for that individual￿ s skills, and l is labour supplied to the market. Following Mincer
(1958), the wage rate is w = w(a;e) where a describes the worker￿ s ability and e is education:
Our insights are driven entirely by the fact that earnings wl then exhibit increasing returns to
scale in e;l. Unfortunately increasing returns signi￿cantly complicate the investigation, as we
must formally consider the failure of second order conditions. To keep the analysis manageable,
many aspects of the model are kept deliberately simple. Generalization in several ways is
straightforward but would unnecessarily complicate the presentation and obscure the relevant
insights.
Young people typically make their human capital investments prior to meeting their future
partners and before raising families. We therefore consider educational choice in a two pe-
riod framework in which educational choice is made in the ￿rst period given expectations of
second period home productivity. This timing is not critical to the results - there are (joint)
increasing returns in earnings regardless of whether education e and labour supply l are chosen
simultaneously or sequentially.
Thus consider a representative worker who is born with ability a and has expectations of
future home productivity b: In the ￿rst period, the worker can invest in e units of workplace
human capital. In the second period, home productivity b is realised. The worker then has a
7unit time endowment where time l 2 [0;1] is spent working in the labour market and h = 1￿l
is time spent on home activities. Traditionally h might be interpreted as leisure, but here we
think of it as time spent raising children and carrying out other domestic activities.5
To keep the algebra under control, we assume the market wage increases linearly with
human capital; i.e. w = w0(a + e) with w0 > 0: This assumption is not critical to the results -
it simpli￿es the algebra as w0 then describes the Mincerian rate of return to education and is
the same for all. The cost of attaining education level e is also linear, ￿e; where ￿ > 0 and is
also the same for all. It is straightforward to show that the results below also hold when higher
ability types have lower education costs.6 It is also useful to abstract from income e⁄ects by
assuming ￿ is a disutility cost (i.e. acquiring education is costly only in that it requires passing
exams) and that all have zero initial wealth.
The government￿ s tax program is described by a pair (S;￿) with S > 0; ￿ 2 [0;1]: Given an
individual￿ s gross labour market earnings yG = wl; after-tax income is
y = S + (1 ￿ ￿)wl:
Thus S=￿ de￿nes a break even level of income: workers with pre-tax earnings yG < S=￿ receive
a net transfer S￿￿yG from the government, while those earning yG > S=￿ pay net tax ￿yG￿S:
We refer to S as the level of social insurance or lump-sum transfers (e.g. a mother might receive
child bene￿t payments) and ￿ as the marginal tax rate on additional earnings. The worker￿ s
second period budget constraint is then
pc ￿ S + (1 ￿ ￿)wl = S + (1 ￿ ￿)w0(a + e)l
where c is consumption and p is the price of the consumption good which we normalise p = 1.
5For people with no children, h might be pure leisure, although time-use studies show that, even in partnered
households without children, considerable time is spent on home-related activities such as cooking and cleaning.
6A more general speci￿cation might instead assume w(:) is non-linear and that the cost of education e is b ca(e)
where b ca(:) is an increasing and strictly convex function which depends on type. Such extensions are qualitatively
unimportant. Given any educational investment k, and hence corresponding educational attainment e = b c￿1
a (k);
second period gross earnings yG = lw(a;b c￿1
a (k)) continue to imply joint increasing returns to l and k: Assuming
w(:) is linear is a useful simpli￿cation which implies w0 can be interpreted as the Mincer return to education. Of
course linear returns and costs could potentially imply an individual makes an unboundedly large investment.
A strictly concave utility function, however, ensures this is never optimal.
8Note the critical non-concavity: (after-tax) earnings have increasing returns in e and l:
Again for simplicity assume second period utility is additively separable in consumption and
home production h = 1 ￿ l; i.e.
U2(c;h) = u(c) + bx(h)
where u;x are strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice di⁄erentiable functions. Note this
speci￿cation implies workers with higher b have a higher marginal return to home production.
We assume education increases general human capital in the workplace but does not improve
domestic productivity. Of course this need not be the case; e.g. Rosen (1983). But it is a
convenient simplifying assumption and all the results in our model still carry through as long
as education increases market productivity by more than it increases home productivity. This
seems a reasonable assumption, especially so if one considers that, if education were to increase
home productivity by as much as it increases workplace productivity, we would be unlikely to
observe the strong positive association between years of education and hours of work found in
Trostel and Walker (2006). For simplicity, then, we assume (post-compulsory) education has
a negligible impact on domestic productivity; i.e. the worker takes domestic productivity b as
given.7
As utility is strictly increasing in c; the budget constraint always binds and so consumption
c = S + (1 ￿ ￿)yG: As the time constraint implies h = 1 ￿ l; the worker￿ s second period
optimisation problem is equivalent to choosing l 2 [0;1] to solve
max
l2[0;1]
u(S + (1 ￿ ￿)w0￿l) + bx(1 ￿ l); (1)
where productivity ￿ = a + e is given in the second period. This objective function is strictly
concave in l and so standard ￿rst order conditions fully describe the maximum. Claim 1 below
describes those conditions. Given optimal labour supply and tax parameters (S;￿); second
7In less developed countries, maternal education is found to have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on child quality. Our








u(S + (1 ￿ ￿)w0￿l) + bx(1 ￿ l)
￿
:




2(￿;:) ￿ ￿[￿ ￿ a]]: (2)
We shall show below that U￿
2(￿;:) is not concave in ￿. Although the optimal education rule, de-
noted ￿￿(a;b); is (generically) unique, there may be several solutions to the ￿rst order conditions
for optimality. Thus simply solving the ￿rst order conditions is not su¢ cient to identify optimal
education choice. The following not only fully determines optimal ￿￿(:); it also describes how
varying the tax program (S;￿) a⁄ects that decision and ex-post labour supply.
3 Optimal Education and Labour Supply
In this section we take the tax parameters (S;￿) as given and solve for the worker￿ s optimal
￿rst period education choice and second period labour supply. The section that follows then
considers how changing tax parameters (S;￿) a⁄ects those choices.
3.1 Second period labour supply
Given second period productivity parameters (￿;b); the worker￿ s optimal second period labour
supply choice, properly denoted l￿(￿;b;S;￿); solves (1): As (S;￿) is held ￿xed in this section,
however, we simplify notation here by subsuming reference to S;￿.
As there may be corner solutions, de￿ne the following functions
bPT(￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿w0u0(S)=x0(1);
bFT(￿) = (1 ￿ ￿)￿w0u0(S + (1 ￿ ￿)w0￿)=x0(0):
Note that bPT is linear and increasing in ￿; but bFT is non-linear and may be a decreasing
10function of ￿ (see Figures 2a and 2b below). For now note that concavity of u and x implies
bPT ￿ bFT with strict inequality if either u or x is strictly concave. Figures 2a and 2b plot
these functions when u(:) exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA).
As the objective function in (1) is concave in l, the Kuhn-Tucker ￿rst order conditions fully
characterize l￿(:). Claim 1 now describes those conditions.
Claim 1. Optimal Second Period Labour Supply.
Given ￿;b ￿ 0; optimality implies:
(i) l￿ = 0 if b > bPT;
(ii) l￿ = 1 if b < bFT;
(iii) otherwise l￿ is described by the ￿rst order condition
bx0(1 ￿ l￿) = ￿w0(1 ￿ ￿)u0(S + (1 ￿ ￿)￿w0l￿): (3)
Claim 1 describes the Kuhn-Tucker conditions implied by (1). People with very high home
productivity, b > bPT; do not participate in the labour market; they choose l￿ = 0: Conversely
people with very low home productivity, b < bFT; participate in full time employment; they
choose l￿ = 1. In the intermediate region where b 2 (bFT;bPT); optimal labour supply implies
l￿ 2 (0;1) and (3) describes the optimal trade-o⁄ between home production and employment
in the market sector. Although one might interpret l￿ as the worker￿ s average participation
rate over a working lifetime, the taxonomy used here is that the interval b 2 (bFT;bPT) is
the part-time region, the region b ￿ bFT is the full participation region while b ￿ bPT is the
non-participant region.
Given this description of optimal labour supply in the second period; the next step is to
determine the optimal education choice e in the ￿rst period. In this ￿rst period problem, we
show there are increasing marginal returns to education for some education levels.
The optimal education choice e depends on how second period labour supply l￿ varies with
productivity: Standard comparative statics establish that labour supply l￿ is strictly decreasing
in home productivity in the part-time region (of course l￿ is constant in the constrained regions).
If utility is linear in consumption, labour supply l￿ is unambigously increasing with ￿: ￿ Risk
11aversion￿is more complicated as there are income e⁄ects. Suppose, for example, a constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, u(c) = c1￿￿=(1 ￿ ￿) where ￿ ￿ 0 is the degree
of relative risk aversion.8 Claim 2 describes how l￿ varies with ￿ in this case.
Claim 2. Optimal Labour Supply with CRRA.
(i) If ￿ < 1 then l￿ is strictly increasing in ￿ for all b 2 (bFT;bPT): Further bPT;bFT are strictly
increasing in ￿:
(ii) If ￿ > 1 then
(a) for low productivities ￿ < S=[(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)w0]; l￿ and bFT are both increasing in ￿;
(b) for ￿ > S=[(￿ ￿ 1)(1 ￿ ￿)w0]; bFT is decreasing in ￿: Further, a bc 2 (bFT;bPT) exists
where l￿ is strictly increasing in ￿ for b 2 (bc;bPT) and strictly decreasing in ￿ for b 2 (bFT;bc]:
Proof is in the Appendix.
Figures 2a and 2b depict these two cases. Figure 2a describes the thresholds bPT and bFT
for low levels of risk aversion, ￿ < 1: Claim 2 implies labour supply is always increasing in ￿:
Further, ￿ high enough implies the worker takes full time employment l￿ = 1: Figure 1b holds
when there is high risk aversion, ￿ > 1: Note that l￿ is decreasing in ￿ for ￿ high enough - high
risk aversion implies the shadow value of consumption becomes very small at high income levels
and the worker instead consumes more ￿ leisure￿(home production). Standard comparative
statics establish that bc, as drawn in Figure 2b, is strictly increasing in ￿.
Figures 2a, 2b here.
3.2 First period education
Given the characterization of l￿ above, we now consider the optimal education choice in the
￿rst period. Note that a worker who invests to productivity level ￿ ￿ a in the ￿rst period
obtains expected utility
U1(￿;:) ￿ [u(S + (1 ￿ ￿)￿w0l￿) + bx(1 ￿ l￿)] ￿ ￿[￿ ￿ a];
with l￿ as de￿ned in Claim 1. A most important object for what follows is
8In our context, with no uncertainty, CRRA refers of course to the degree of concavity of the utility-of-
consumption function.
12MR = (1 ￿ ￿)w0l￿u0(c); (4)
where c = S+(1￿￿)￿w0l￿: Totally di⁄erentiating U1 with respect to ￿; noting that l￿ is chosen
optimally, the Envelope Theorem implies
dU1
d￿
= MR ￿ ￿:
Hence MR describes the worker￿ s marginal return to education.
First consider the simplest case, that workers are risk neutral and so without further loss
of generality u(c) = c: Then MR = (1 ￿ ￿)w0l￿: Thus the marginal return to education is the
Mincer rate of return (net of tax) multiplied by expected labour supply. Since Claim 2 with
￿ = 0 implies l￿ is increasing in ￿ (strictly in the part-time region), MR is an increasing function
of ￿: That is, risk neutrality guarantees there are increasing marginal returns to education. The
reason is simple - very low ￿ workers who do not participate in the labour market have a zero
marginal return to workplace capital investment. In contrast, very high productivity workers
who choose l￿ = 1 have the highest return. Increasing returns then occur as labour supply, and
hence the utilisation rate of human capital, is increasing in productivity.
The case with strictly risk averse workers is more complicated because the marginal return
to education depends on the marginal utility of consumption. We now simplify by assuming a
CRRA utility function with ￿ ￿ 1:9
To describe the optimal education choice, we need to describe MR as a function of ￿: To
do this, ￿rst de￿ne ￿PT(b) as the inverse function of b = bPT(￿); i.e. ￿PT = (bPT)￿1(b): This
implies
￿PT = bx0(1)=[(1 ￿ ￿)w0u0(S)]:
Note that ￿ = ￿PT(b) simply relabels the locus labelled b = bPT in Figure 2a.
9The results are qualitatively identical with ￿ > 1 but the exposition is more complicated as Figure 1b
implies the full participation region may not exist (e.g. when b is large). The properties of MR with ￿ > 1
are identical to the case ￿ 2 (0;1) as drawn in Figure 2; there are zero returns for ￿ in the non-participation
region, increasing marginal returns in the early part of the part-time region (as returns become strictly positive)
and decreasing marginal returns for large enough ￿ (as labour supply is then decreasing with productivity - see
Figure 1b) but the full particpation region may not exist.
13We also need to de￿ne the inverse function of bFT(￿): Note for ￿ < 1 that Claim 2 implies
b = bFT(￿) is a strictly increasing function. Hence its inverse function is also well-de￿ned and
so de￿ne ￿FT = (bFT)￿1(b) and ￿FT(.) is also an increasing function. ￿FT(b) corresponds to
the locus labelled bFT in Figure 2a. Figure 2a and (4) now imply MR = MR(￿;b) where
MR = 0 if ￿ ￿ ￿PT(b) (5)
= (1 ￿ ￿)w0l￿u0(S + (1 ￿ ￿)￿w0l￿) if ￿ 2 (￿PT(b);￿FT(b))
= (1 ￿ ￿)w0u0(S + (1 ￿ ￿)￿w0) if ￿ ￿ ￿FT(b):
Figure 3 below graphs MR by productivity ￿, given ￿ ￿ 1 and b ￿xed, and on the assumption
MR is monotonic over the part-time region. For productivities ￿ ￿ ￿PT(b); the worker does
not participate in the labour market and so MR = 0: For productivities ￿ ￿ ￿FT(b);the worker
chooses l￿ = 1 and MR is then decreasing in ￿ as the marginal utility of consumption decreases
with after tax earnings. There are necessarily increasing returns to education for ￿ around
the non-participant margin, ￿ = ￿PT; because returns become strictly positive at that point.
However as earnings increase with ￿; the marginal utility of consumption decreases and so it
is not necessarily the case that MR is increasing over the entire part-time region. For ease of
exposition, we shall assume MR is single peaked in this region. Although MR is continuous
in ￿ (as labour supply is continuous) its slope is not continuous at the margins ￿PT;￿FT as
@l￿=@￿ is constrained equal to zero outside of the part-time region.10
Figure 3 here.
Given this characterization of MR(:); we can now describe the optimal education decision





2(￿;b) ￿ ￿[￿ ￿ a]]
where MR ￿ @U￿
2=@￿: The necessary conditions for optimality imply either a corner solution
(i) ￿ = a and MR(a;b) ￿ ￿;
or an interior optimum
10See the Appendix which describes the slope of MR.
14(ii) ￿ = ￿￿(b) where MR(￿￿;b) = ￿:
Assuming MR is single-peaked as drawn in Figure 3, there are two candidate optima. A
local maximum occurs where MR(￿;b) = ￿ on the decreasing portion of the marginal revenue
curve and we let ￿￿(b) denote that solution (where MR single-peaked implies ￿￿ is unique).
The other candidate maximum is that the worker chooses zero education where such a choice
is optimal only if MR(a;b) ￿ ￿.
Consider then a worker with low ability a < ￿PT(b) for whom MR(a;b) = 0: With increasing
returns to education, these workers compare the value of no education, ￿ = a; against educating






which describes the surplus to educating up to ￿￿: If V > 0 the optimal education choice implies
￿ = ￿￿(b) is optimal as it generates positive value relative to no education. The converse is
implied by V < 0; the worker is better o⁄ choosing no education ￿ = a: The optimal education
choice therefore depends on the sign of V:
Figure 3 depicts the critical ability ac where V (ac;b) = 0; i.e. the two shaded areas are
equal: A worker with ability a = ac is indi⁄erent between no education and education to ￿￿.
As ac must lie on the increasing portion of MR; it follows that ac < ￿FT: Proposition 1 now
establishes that lower ability workers, those with a < ac choose zero education, while higher
ability workers invest to ￿￿ ￿ ac: The large discontinuity arises as there are increasing marginal
returns to education.
Proposition 1. For given b; suppose MR is single-peaked and suppose that peak occurs at
ability b a: Then for any ￿ 2 (0;MR(b a;:)); an ability ac < b a exists where:
(i) workers with ability a < ac choose ￿ = a (no education) and ex-post choose low labour
supply;
(ii) workers with ability a 2 [ac;￿￿(a)] choose ￿ = ￿￿(a) ￿ a and ex-post choose much
higher labour supply.
Proof. For any ￿ < MR(b a;:); continuity and singlepeakedness of MR implies an ac < b a exists
15where V (ac;b) = 0 (though ac may be negative). As
@V
@a
= ￿ ￿ MR(a;b)
it follows immediately that V (a;b) < 0 for a < ac: Thus workers with ability a < ac choose no
education. It also follows straightforwardly that V (a;b) > 0 for all a 2 [ac;￿￿) (as V (￿￿;b) = 0)
and so such types invest to ￿￿: This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Increasing returns to education implies discontinuous education choice. Low ability types
with a < ac choose no education and, as ac < b a ￿ ￿FT; these workers either do not participate
in the labour market, or only take part-time employment. Workers with su¢ ciently high ability
however choose investment ￿￿ > a and, if ￿￿ > ￿FT as drawn in Figure 3, participate in full
time employment in the second period. Of course it is the switch to full time employment which
makes the ￿rst period education decision worthwhile.
We refer to workers with abilities a ￿ ac(b) as home specialists: such workers do not invest
in workplace human capital and have relatively low labour supplies l￿ < 1: An unrealistic
implication of Proposition 1, however, is that very high ability workers, those with abilities
a ￿ ￿￿(b) also choose no education. This feature occurs as we have assumed risk averse
workers, a wage function w(a;e) which is additive in a and e and education costs which are
the same for all. This feature disappears if we instead assume workers are risk neutral, a wage
function w(a;e) where ability and education are complementary inputs (so that higher ability
workers have a greater Mincerian return to education) and/or education costs ca which decrease
with ability a. Higher ability types will then invest in more education. We do not consider such
extensions since the increasing returns to education issue, which is of central interest here, is
clearly robust to such variations.
Proposition 2 now shows how home specialisation depends on home productivity.
Proposition 2. Home specialists.
ac(b) is increasing in b:
Proof is in the Appendix.
Home specialists compare the payo⁄ of choosing no education against investing up to pro-
16ductivity ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ a: An increase in home productivity increases the opportunity cost of
working in the market sector and so lowers the relative return to education. Hence workers
with greater home productivity are more likely to be home specialists.
4 Policy and Welfare
The previous section characterized the optimal education investments and ex-post labour supply
choices of individuals given tax policy parameters (S;￿): The central feature is that the market
dichotomises into home specialists, those with abilities (a;b) satisfying a < ac(b) who choose
no education and have low market sector participation rates, and work specialists, those with
abilities a > ac(b) who invest signi￿cantly in education and have high participation rates. We
now consider how changes in tax policy a⁄ect those choices and describe the corresponding
deadweight losses.
As the optimal choices depend on the underlying tax policy (S;￿); we now extend the nota-
tion. Speci￿cally, optimal labour supply is now properly denoted l = l￿(￿;b;S;￿); the marginal
return to education is MR(￿;b;S;￿); and the marginal home specialist is a = ac(b;S;￿). For
ease of exposition we maintain a CRRA utility function with ￿ ￿ 1:
Proposition 3. Tax Policy and Home Specialists.
ac(b;S;￿) is strictly increasing in S and ￿:
Proof is in the Appendix.
With increasing returns to education, the marginal home specialist compares no education
- which implies ex-post productivity ￿ = a (resulting in low ex-post labour supply) - with
investing to productivity ￿ = ￿￿ ￿ a (resulting in high ex-post labour supply). As an increase
in the income tax rate reduces the return to education, this implies ac increases with ￿ - more
workers become home specialists.
The impact of social security S on education incentives is more subtle. The insight is that
home specialists have low earnings in the second period (their labour market productivity is
low and they choose low labour supply). As their marginal utility of consumption is relatively
high, an increase in S raises their marginal payo⁄ more relative to being educated and working
17full-time with relatively high earnings. Lump-sum transfers lower the value V of a switch to
a higher education level (and higher consumption), and so increases ac: Note this disincentive
disappears if u(:) is linear.
4.1 Deadweight Losses
Given the labour market is competitive and there are no externalities by assumption, the
marginal social return to investment is simply the private marginal return when S = ￿ = 0:
Hence de￿ne the marginal social return to education:
SR(￿;b) = MR(￿;b;0;0):
A useful insight is the marginal social return to education is simply a special case of the previous
analysis and so also exhibits increasing returns. Let aP(b) ￿ ac(b;0;0) denote the socially
e¢ cient marginal home specialist and ￿P(b) ￿ ￿￿(b;0;0) denote the socially e¢ cient investment
level (for higher ability types). Note for any S;￿ > 0, Proposition 3 implies aP(b) < ac(b;S;￿);
i.e. too many workers become home specialists.
Figure 4 plots SR and MR for given S;￿ > 0: The proof of Proposition 3 implies MR must
lie below SR: It can also be shown that ￿PT;￿FT lie to the right compared to their values
when S = ￿ = 0:
Figure 4 here.
Figure 4 depicts the deadweight losses implied by the tax program for the marginal home
specialist a = ac: As aP < ac; the socially optimal outcome is that the worker invests to ￿P
where SR = ￿: If the marginal home specialist invests to ￿￿; the deadweight loss due to the
tax program is the light-shaded Harberger triangle labelled DWL2: For workers with higher
abilities, a > ac; the deadweight loss implied by the tax program always corresponds to such
(small) Harberger triangles.
But suppose instead the marginal home specialist a = ac takes the no education option,
￿ = ac: As the worker is indi⁄erent between ￿ = a and ￿￿; the additional deadweight loss due
to this no education choice is the area between SR and MR over productivies ￿ 2 [ac;￿￿]: This
18additional area is dark-shaded and labelled DWL1 in Figure 4. The large substitution e⁄ect
induced by increasing marginal returns to education implies the deadweight loss is not a small
Harberger triangle; instead the loss can be very large. That loss re￿ ects the total loss in tax as
the worker switches to home specialisation. Of course workers with abilities a 2 [aS;ac) strictly
prefer the no education choice while the socially optimal decision is that they invest to ￿S. The
corresponding deadweight losses are large.
5 Some Illustrative Evidence
Although the model in the previous section is highly stylised, it shows clearly why increasing
returns to education in the earnings function, E = w(a;e)l; lead naturally to task specialisation.
Depending on productivity parameters (a;b); an individual chooses between work or home spe-
cialisation. Proposition 1 identi￿es the partition ac(b;S,￿) where workers with ability a < ac
prefer to become home specialists. Proposition 2 establishes home specialists are characterised
by relatively high home productivity and these types choose low education and have low par-
ticipation rates in the labour market. If it is assumed that, for cultural or biological reasons,
women tend to be more productive than men in the home, then the model implies women are
more likely to become home specialists than men. This assumption is also consistent with the
fact that male participation rates tend to be very high. Proposition 3 establishes the home
specialist partition ac is strictly increasing in income tax rates ￿ and lump-sum transfers S:
Thus tax policy has a potentially large impact on female education and participation rates with
correspondingly large deadweight losses.
The aim of this section is to describe correlations between the tax policies of 20 OECD
countries and average male and female labour-force participation rates and years of education.11
These correlations may be consistent with alternative theories, as a referee has pointed out, and
aggregate data may disguise within-country variation in other variables that are not captured
by our data. Nonetheless, the data usefully illustrate cross-country correlations.12 The dataset,
11The countries for which we have data are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Germany,
Denmark, Finland, France, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the USA.
12Our empirical analysis is reduced-form. Identi￿cation within a simultaneous equation system is problematic
even if the analysis is done with the best of micro data, and with our aggregate dataset we do not have any
19an unbalanced panel over the period 1980 to 2001, were kindly provided by Florence Jaumotte
of the OECD (see Jaumotte (2004) for a full explanation of the construction of the variables).
We augmented them with information on years of education by gender from the Barro and Lee
(2000) database.13
Jaumotte (2004) describes how education rates and participation rates have been changing in
our sample of OECD countries over the period 1980 to 2001. All countries have seen an increase
in both female participation rates and education rates. The increase in female education rates
is small in the most developed OECD countries, where female education rates are already high.
But there nonetheless remains a signi￿cant gap in participation rates. This probably re￿ ects
the fact that today￿ s average female participation rates depend on female educational choices
made over the last 40 years. Since we are unable to take into account such long run changes
in educational choices, the reduced form regressions reported below understate the long-term
e⁄ect of a change in tax policy on female labor market participation rates. However, they do
illustrate the importance of tax policy.
Figure 1 in the Introduction plotted average female participation rates against male partici-
pation rates for each country over this time period. As noted, there is considerable heterogene-
ity in female participation rates. Spain, Italy, Ireland and Korea have low female participation
rates. The highest female participation rate is in Sweden, closely followed by Iceland, Finland
and Denmark. In contrast, there is much less variation in male participation rates. In terms of
the model, it may be helpful to think of a similar distribution of women in each OECD country
reacting to tax policies that di⁄er across countries. For instance, the tax program in Italy
induces a larger fraction of the women to switch into home specialisation than does the tax
program in Sweden. In contrast, men are not a⁄ected by such di⁄erences in policies, because
their values of b are closer to zero.
Our empirical analysis uses a number of tax measures, described below.
(i) The average tax rate, calculated as the average tax rate for a single childless person at 67%
appropriate instruments.
13The education variables are from Barro Lee (2000) at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html..
This provides 5-year data points so we interpolated the intervening years.
20of the average production wage (APW).14
Note this tax variable is derived from the relevant country￿ s tax code, it is not average tax
paid. As the model makes clear, the marginal home specialist calculates when young the
expected tax payable if s/he were to invest in education and become a work specialist, and
she then compares the resulting payo⁄ against that obtained by being a home specialist
with no taxes on home production. Thus, unlike the standard tax-literature approach, it
is the average tax which drives the home specialisation decision, and not the marginal tax
rate. The above tax variable is a measure of that average tax. However we are unable with
our aggregate data to distinguish young female cohorts who are making their educational
choices from the older women who made their decisions some time ago and for whom such
investments are sunk costs. For the younger women, we would expect the current average
tax rate to have a larger e⁄ect than the older women, but we are unable to test for this
here.
(ii) The tax wedge 2nd earner. This is calculated as the ratio of ￿ tax second earner￿and the
average tax rate of a single individual earning the same gross income of the 2nd earner.15
Given that the stock of men typically have higher education rates, and assuming that women
have higher home productivities, the second earner is likely to be the female partner.16
High taxes on second earners are then roughly equivalent to raising ￿ for women, and so
are likely to increase the number of female home specialists and have a negative e⁄ect on
female participation rates and education.
(iii) Child bene￿ts. This variable is de￿ned as the percentage increase in household disposable
income from child bene￿ts for two children at a gross earnings level of 133% of the APW
(of which 33% is earned by the wife).17
14See Jaumotte (2004) for more details about the variables. In the regressions, our choice of functional form
for these variables was determined after appropriate speci￿cation checks.
15The tax second earner is de￿ned as {1- [(Household net income when the wife￿ s earnings are 67% of the
APW)- (Household net income when the wife does not work)]/[ [(Household gross income when the wife￿ s
earnings are 67% of the APW)- (Household gross income when the wife does not work)]}. The husband is
assumed to earn 100% of APW and the household is assumed to have two children. The di⁄erence between
gross and net income includes income taxes, employee social security contributions and the like.
16Moreover, this seems to be the case even in countries where female educational enrolments for more recent
cohorts exceed those of men.
17Thus Child Bene￿ts={[Di⁄erence in household income when the household earns 133% of APW and has two
21Child bene￿t payments are an example of a non-taxable lump-sum transfer. Proposition 3
predicts that such bene￿ts will increase home specialisation; i.e. lower female participation
rates and education.
(iv) Public spending on child care. This measures state spending on childcare (including formal
daycare and preschool expenditures) as a percentage of GDP.
We interpret childcare subsidies as a subsidy on labour market participation for families with
children. Booth and Coles (2007) provide a discussion of this policy in the context of an
imperfectly competitive labour market.
(v) To control for changing demographics, we also condition on the variable, the number of
kids aged 0-14 per woman aged 15-64.
Table 1 gives the means of these variables.
Table 1: Means of Variables (Pooled OECD Data)
Variable Mean
Average tax rate 24.41
Tax wedge 2nd earner 1.36
Index of child bene￿ts including tax allowances 7.38
Public spending child care as % GDP 0.72
Number of kids aged 0-14 per woman aged 15-64 0.60
% Female workforce participation, age group 25-54 70.03
% Male workforce participation, age group 25-54 93.15
Average years of education, female population 25+ years 8.18
Average years of education, male population 25+ years 9.00
.
Panels A and B of Table 2 report ￿xed-e⁄ects (FE) estimates of the reduced -form female
and male participation and years-of-education equations (with t-statistics in parentheses).18
Columns [1] and [3] report the speci￿cations of participation and education respectively without
a time trend, while columns [2] and [4] report the results with a time trend. Our ￿xed-e⁄ects
estimates are from a time-demeaned equation that estimates deviations from the within-country
children and that same household-type without any children]/[Household income without any children]}.100.
18The dependent variable for the fe/male education equation is the natural logarithm of the average years of
schooling in the fe/male population aged 25 years or more. The dependent variable in the fe/maleparticipation
equation is the natural logarithm of fe/male labor force participation rates for the age group 25-54 years.
22mean and which therefore removes the country-speci￿c ￿xed-e⁄ects that might otherwise bias
our estimated coe¢ cients.19
First consider participation. From Panel A, we see that female participation is negatively
correlated with the average tax rate for a single person, although the e⁄ect is quite small in both
speci￿cations (with and without a time trend). From Panel B we see that average tax rates
are also negatively correlated with male participation, but in absolute terms this association is
far smaller than was found for women..
Next consider the impact of the tax wedge second earner. This is associated with signi￿cantly
lower female participation, as expected. The absolute magnitude is relatively large, especially
for the speci￿cation without the time trend. In contrast, higher tax wedges are associated with
higher male participation, although the magnitude is very small. As the tax wedge increases,
women participate less and so their men participate more, although this e⁄ect for men is
imprecisely estimated once the time trend is included.
The third tax policy variable is the proxy for lump-sum transfers S, namely child bene-
￿ts including tax allowances. In the theory section we showed that more generous lump-sum
transfers reduce the return to working in the labour market and so lead to lower education and
female participation rates. This is borne out by the statistically signi￿cant negative association,
the magnitude of which is very similar across both female participation speci￿cations. For men,
however, family cash transfers are positively correlated with participation in both speci￿cations.
Our theory suggested a positive e⁄ect only if utility is linear in consumption.
The fourth tax policy variable is public spending child care. From column [1], we see this
is signi￿cantly positively associated with female participation and negatively correlated with
male participation. This is likely to re￿ ect the fact that, as childcare expenditure increases,
women can participate more and this allows their men to supply less labour. However, once
the time trend is included - see Column [2] - this variable becomes negative and statistically
insigni￿cant for both women and men.
19Our analysis is reduced-form rather than a simultaneous equation system. Identi￿cation within a simulta-
neous equation system is problematic without appropriate instruments. Note that he time trend reduces any
serial correlation.
23Table 2: FE Estimates of Female and Male Participation and Education
Participation Education
A. Female [1] [2] [3] [4]
Ln average tax rate single -0.049 -0.059 -0.064 -0.072
(1.42) (1.98) (1.43) (2.06)
Ln tax wedge 2nd earner -0.208 -0.132 -0.525 -0.280
(3.76) (2.69) (5.84) (3.79)
Ln child bene￿ts & tax allowances -0.063 -0.057 -0.099 -0.086
(2.73) (2.86) (3.29) (3.67)
Ln public spending child care 0.039 -0.029 0.144 0.283
(2.37) (1.66) (6.71) (1.38)
Ln number of kids -0.816 -0.820 -0.116 -0.156
(12.53) (14.60) (1.35) (2.35)




Ln average tax rate single -0.016 -0.012 -0.023 -0.029
(1.65) (1.68) (0.60) (0.97)
Ln tax wedge 2nd earner 0.031 0.003 -0.355 -0.152
(1.99) (0.23) (4.68) 2.41
Ln child bene￿ts & tax allowances 0.014 0.012 -0.086 -0.075
(2.21) (2.51) (3.39) (3.77)
Ln public spending child care -0.030 -0.005 0.076 -0.020
(6.48) (1.12) (4.19) (1.15)
Ln number of kids -0.057 -0.055 0.004 -0.029
(3.14) (4.11) (0.06) (0.50)
Time trend -0.002 -0.008
(10.39) (9.25)
R2 0.313 0.623
No. of observations 158 158 155 155
No. of countries 20 20 19 19
Finally, an increase in the number of dependent children per woman can be interpreted as a
rise in b and this has a signi￿cant negative association with female participation.20 For men, the
child dependency variable has a small negative correlation in contrast to the more pronounced
negative correlation with female participation. This is robust across all speci￿cations.
Next we consider the estimated correlations between the tax policy variables and female
years of education, reported in the last two columns of Table 2 (top panel). A priori, we would
20From Proposition 2, we know that ac(b) is increasing in b: A fall in the number of children might be
interpreted as a decline in b; and consequently we would expect female education and participation to increase.
Our estimates show that the impact of a decline in the number of children aged 0-14 per woman is indeed
associated with an increase in female participation.
24expect that policies associated with lower tax wedges for second earners, or that subsidize mar-
ket purchase of child care, would be directly associated with higher female education investment
rates, since the returns to market work will be higher. Our estimates for women in Panel A
show that this is indeed the case. Average years of female education are negatively association
with the tax wedge and also with child bene￿ts, a correlation that is statistically signi￿cant at
the 1% level. Moreover female education is positively association with expenditure on child-
care, again as expected. Notice also that, while male years of education exhibit correlations
with these variables of similar sign, they are of much smaller absolute magnitude and are less
precisely determined.
From Proposition 2, we know that ac(b) is increasing in b: A fall in the number of children
might be interpreted as a decline in b; and consequently we would expect female education
and participation to increase but male education to be una⁄ected. Our estimates show that
the number of children aged 0-14 per woman is signi￿cantly negatively correlated with female
education only for the speci￿cation with the time trend. In contrast, for male education there
is no correlation in either speci￿cation, as expected.
In summary, female participation and years of education are signi￿cantly correlated with all
the tax policy variables and the signs are consistent with our theory. Moreover, the estimated
correlations between male participation and the tax policy variables are also as expected and
all of the estimated coe¢ cients are substantially smaller in absolute terms than for females.
Next we illustrate some predictions from our empirical speci￿cation for two countries.
5.1 Discussion
Figure 1 showed that there are big di⁄erences across countries in female participation rates.
These di⁄erences are correlated with our family-related tax policy variables and the proxy for
demographics. As expected, the controls were less able to explain male participation rates .
To illustrate the policy e⁄ects, we calculate what US participation and years of education
would look like if the US had the tax policy values of a typical Scandinavian country, Sweden.
This simple counterfactual exercise is not intended to imply that one country is more e¢ cient
than another, but rather to illustrate the magnitude of the e⁄ects of the policy variables. To
25carry out the counter-factual exercise, we use the estimates reported in columns [1] and [3] of
Table 2 to show predicted labour force participation for the USA.21 The ￿rst row of Table 3
gives these predictions for US women and men. The other rows of Table 3 shows how these
predictions change as policies are altered to Swedish values.22
Table 3: Predicted US Participation and Education, Swedish Tax Policy
Comparative static changes Women Men
Particip Educ Particip Educ
[1] All US values 74.14 11.72 92.81 12.07
[2] US with Swedish tax wedge 2nd earner 77.77 13.22 92.15 13.09
[3] US, both Swedish tax policy variables 77.00 16.00 91.85 13.03
[4] US, with Swedish child bfts & tax allowance 70.22 10.76 93.94 11.20
[5] US with Swedish childcare expenditures 79.42 15.11 88.03 12.06
The second row shows how participation and years of education would increase if the US
were to lower its tax wedge for second earners to the Swedish value. Such a policy shift would
increase female participation by nearly 4 percentage points to 77.8%, a large e⁄ect, but would
leave male participation little a⁄ected. Row [3] shows the combined e⁄ects of adopting Swedish
tax policy as summarised by the two variables average tax rate single and tax wedge second
earner.23 Predicted female participation in the USA when Swedish tax policy is introduced
is 77% while years of education increase to 16. The male participation rate remains virtually
unchanged as does male education.
Row [4] shows what happens when we restore tax policy to US values and instead change the
index for family cash transfers from the average US value of 4.1 to the average Swedish value
of 9.8. As shown, predicted US female participation declines to 70% while male participation
increases to nearly 94%, perhaps re￿ ecting substitution between family members in response
to increasing cash transfers. Female education falls to 10.8 years while male education drops to
11.2.
Row [5] shows what happens when US public childcare expenditure as a percentage of
21For these calculations we use the speci￿cations without the time trend.
22For completeness, if the U.S. had Swedish child dependency rates then, ceteris paribus, female participation
would increase to 83.2% and male participation increases to 93.6%.
23The US value for the average tax rate single is 22.16 while for Sweden it is much higher, at 29.6. However
the tax wedge is higher in the US at 1.33, while it is much lower at 1.0 in Sweden.
26GDP is increased to match Swedish rates.24 It can be seen that US female participation
increases to almost 80%, an increase of over 5 percentage points. Male participation drops,
possibly again re￿ ecting substitution between partners within a household as more women
become work specialists. This emphasises the importance of state childcare expenditures as a
targeted subsidy.25 Notice also that female years of education incresae to 15 while male years
are little a⁄ected.
In summary, although some have suggested it is a puzzle that Sweden is characterized by
both high average tax rates and high labour supply, there are other important tax policies that
are correlated with female labour supply, as our example has illustrated. This is not to suggest
that one country is more e¢ cient than another, but simply illustrates the magnitude of the
implied correlations.
6 Conclusion
This paper considered optimal educational investment and labour supply and showed that
there are increasing returns in the earnings function. Individual labour market responses to tax
policy are shown to be sensitive to home productivity. Speci￿cally, increasing returns implies
that a tax on labour income can generate large, non-marginal substitution e⁄ects, driving those
with a comparative advantage in home production out of the labour market. Assuming home
productivity varies substantially by gender, the model predicts that individual responses to
￿scal policy will vary signi￿cantly across men and women.
Consistent with the theory, our empirical results indicate that gender di⁄erences in labour
supply responses to tax policy can contribute to explaining di⁄erences in aggregate labour sup-
ply across countries. Our estimates show that female participation and education are negatively
correlated with the average tax rate for a single person and the tax wedge for second earners, and
positively correlated with public expenditure on childcare. Female participation and education
are also negatively associated with lump-sum income transfers as proxied by child bene￿ts. In
summary, while high tax rates - especially on second earners - encourage women to switch from
24This involves a shift from just 0.474% to 1.8753%.
25Such expenditures might also have the additional e⁄ect of improving the human capital of children, as
argued recently by the UK Government, but that is a separate issue not considered here.
27market to home production, these distortions can be partially o⁄set by targeted employment
subsidies such as state-funded childcare. Our analysis suggests that the co-existence in some
countries, such as Sweden, of high average tax rates and high labour supply is in fact consistent
with the observation that labour supply responses vary by gender in response to heterogeneity
in family-related ￿scal policies. Of course these estimated correlations in our OECD dataset
may be consistent with alternative theories as well as with our theoretical framework. We hope
that future work will test our hypotheses more rigorously using micro data.
In addition, we hope in the future to develop further our theoretical framework to allow
for endogenous fertility decisions. We have already made a start, in our companion paper,
Booth and Coles (2008), in which we model match formation.26 While endogenising fertility
decisions would undoubtedly greatly complicate the model, it will be interesting to see if such
an approach might yield additional insights. A further extension of the model would be to
explore the role of divorce in a⁄ecting female education and participation rates. Chiappori
et al. (2006) point out that women￿ s education rates have now caught up with those of men
and that in 15 out of 17 OECD countries women now have higher enrolment rates. Moreover,
there has been a secular increase in female labour market participation rates in all but one of
the OECD countries (Jaumotte, 2004). There are many potential explanations for the recent
increase in female educational enrolments and labour market participation rates. One is the
decline in discrimination against women in the labour market. As women experience improved
career opportunities, they enjoy a higher return to tertiary education and so invest more. Also
as divorce rates have grown over the last two decades, one might argue that investing in a career
provides a woman with insurance against marital breakdown. These represent important areas
for future research. While we have made a start on this in Booth and Coles (2008), where in
a model without taxation we consider how costly divorce can a⁄ect partners￿behaviour, more
work remains to be done.
26Societies are characterized by customs governing the allocation of non-market goods such as marital partner-
ships. In Booth and Coles (2008) we explored how such customs a⁄ect the educational investment decisions of
young singles and the subsequent joint labor supply decisions of partnered couples. We considered two separate
matching paradigms (one where partners marry for money and the other where partners marry for romantic
reasons orthogonal to productivity or debt) and showed that, while marrying for money generates greater in-
vestment e¢ ciency, romantic matching increases aggregate productivity. This is because it increases the number
of educated and talented women participating in the labour market.
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7 Appendix A
Proof of Claim 2.
The de￿nition of bFT and CRRA implies
bFT = ￿(1 ￿ ￿)w0(S + (1 ￿ ￿)￿)￿￿=x0(0):




(1 ￿ ￿)w0[S + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)w0￿]




? 0 as S + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)w0￿ ? 0:





￿bx00 ￿ ￿2(1 ￿ ￿)2w2
0u00[u0(yPT) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)w0l￿u00(yPT)]
where yPT = S + (1 ￿ ￿)￿w0l￿: Concavity of x and u implies @l￿=@￿ > 0 if and only if
u0(yPT) + ￿(1 ￿ ￿)w0l￿u00(yPT) > 0: CRRA now implies
@l￿
@￿
? 0 as S + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿w0l￿ ? 0; (6)
where b 2 (bFT;bPT) implies l￿ 2 (0;1):
The statement of the Claim follows from these facts and (a) l￿ is strictly decreasing in b
for b 2 (bFT;bPT); (b) l￿ = 1 at b = bFT and (c) l￿ = 0 at b = bPT: bc is de￿ned where
S + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)w0￿l￿ = 0:






and ac is then de￿ned by the implicit function V (ac;b) = 0: Di⁄erentiating V (:) with respect










Now (5) implies @[MR]=@b = 0 outside of the part-time region. In the part-time region ￿ 2
(￿PT;￿FT); (3) in Claim 1 implies that l￿ is strictly decreasing in b: Further CRRA with ￿ ￿ 1
implies
@
dl￿[l￿u0(S + (1 ￿ ￿)￿w0l￿)] =
S + (1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿w0l￿
[S + (1 ￿ ￿)￿w0l￿]￿+1 > 0:
(5) and ￿ < 1 now imply @[MR]=@b < 0 in the part-time region. Hence we have @V=@b < 0: As
31the proof of Proposition 1 implies @V=@a > 0 at a = ac; the Implicit Function Theorem implies
ac increases with b:






and ac is given by the implicit function V (ac;b;S;￿) = 0: Di⁄erentiating V wrt S; noting that










Now (5) with ￿ < 1 implies MR does not change with S in the non-participant region (it is
zero) and is strictly decreasing in S in the part-time27 and full-participation regions. Hence












(5) with ￿ < 1 again implies MR does not change in the non-participant region (it is zero) and
is strictly decreasing in ￿ in the part-time and full participation regions. Hence ac increases
with ￿: This completes the proof of Proposition 3.
27For ￿ 2 (￿PT;￿FT); (3) implies l￿ decreases with S while total earnings, S+(1￿￿)￿w0l￿ increase. Together











Figure 1: Female and Male Labour Force Participation 
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Figure 3: Optimal Education Choice (bo given) 
 
The horizontal line γ  is the marginal cost of education while MR is the marginal 
return. The critical ability level a
c is where the two shaded areas are equal. A worker 
with this ability level is just indifferent between no education and educating to α*. 
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Figure 4: Deadweight Losses 
 
The horizontal line γ  denotes the marginal cost of education, while the curves SR and 
MR denote the marginal social and private returns to education respectively.  If the 
marginal home specialist a=a
c takes the no education option, the additional 
deadweight loss is the area between SR and MR over productivies α∈[a
c, α *], 
labelled DWL1. 
 
 
 